In the present Internet Draft (ID) 
Introduction
In the present PIM-SM Internet Draft (ID) [1] , most of the control messages fall into the link-local category, and are sent to the adjacent routers only, using ALL_PIM_ROUTERS as the destination address. Hello, Join/Prune and Assert messages are included in this category. If a forged link-local message is sent to the ALL_PIM_ROUTERS multicast address by an attacker, it will affect the construction of the distribution tree. The effects will vary for different types of forged messages, from very severe to minor.
Authentication according to the PIM-SM ID
In the PIM-SM ID, IPsec [2] transport mode using Authentication Header [3] has been recommended to prevent attacks generated by forged control messages. However, according to the current specification of IPsec [2, 3] , the anti-replay option does not support the case of a Security Association (SA) identified by a multicast destination address. For this reason, the PIM-SM ID suggests that the anti-replay option be disabled. It also assumes that manual configuration of SAs will be performed, although it does not preclude the use of a negotiation protocol such as the Internet Key Exchange to establish SAs. Finally, the IPsec Security Parameter Index (SPI) = 0 will be used all the time.
Limitations of the PIM-SM ID
Although the anti-replay mechanism is optional in the AH protocol, it has an important role in countering Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. If it is disabled, a receiver cannot differentiate between a fresh new packet and a previously received one. All these packets will be received and processed by the receiver. Thus, it will be affected in two ways. Firstly, it will waste its resource by calculating the Integrity Check Value for some already received packets, and this may cause a DoS attack. Secondly, a replayed packet may change any Join, Prune, Assert or Hello state within the receiving router.
For inbound packet processing, three parameters (SPI, destination address, protocol used) distinguish an SA and are used in Security Association lookup. In [1] , it is assumed that there should be a different Security Association Database (SAD) for each router interface, so that a different authentication method can be used for each interface. For PIM link-local messages, the three parameters (SPI = 0, destination address = ALL_PIM _ROUTERS, protocol used = AH) are fixed for any link-local message. It is clear that these three parameters are inadequate to differentiate among received packets and will fail to map a received packet with the associated SAD entry.
The present ID requires a PIM router to establish one SA per local link or interface it has. In some cases, more than one sender is connected through the same interface. In that situation, only one SA for that interface is insufficient, if different senders use different authentication methods. That means, instead of one SA per interface, it is necessary to establish one SA per directly connected sender. Obviously, we have to maintain a different SAD per sender as well.
Proposed technique
We are now in the position to present our own proposal [4] . To activate the anti-replay mechanism in a multi-sender multicast group communication, in the receiver end, we have to maintain a separate sliding window for each sender [5] . Although separate sliding windows clearly should be forbidden in the general case of a large potential number of senders, for a specific PIM receiver router, the number of senders will be equal to the number of directly connected PIM routers, which will be small. Hence, we are strongly proposing that the anti-replay mechanism be activated while sending PIM link-local messages, and that a PIM router maintain a different sliding window for each directly connected sender.
If we use the corresponding sender address and the SPI in the SA lookup process instead of the previously mentioned three parameters, we will be able to eliminate the errors present in the SA lookup process of the PIM ID. For an incoming packet, the source address will be unique for a specific sender and in conjunction with the SPI it will be possible to sort out a specific SA for that sender from the SAD entries. Use of the sender address to index SA lookup has been accepted in a recent version of the AH ID [6] .
We are assuming that the Network Administrator will configure a router manually during its boot up process. This will not be onerous, given the number of parameters that have to be manually configured for a router on boot up. Automatic configuration is required for dynamic groups, but the configuration of PIM-SM routers is very static. In contrast to a host computer, a router is always connected with other routers. It is not member of a particular multicast group, and does not serve a particular group only.
In the recent ID for the AH protocol [6] there is a provision for a 64-bit Extended Sequence Number (ESN). Both the sender and the receiver maintain a 64-bit counter for the sliding window protocol. If we use ESN, we can send 2 64 -1 packets. A PIM-SM router is unlikely to exceed this number in its lifetime. For this reason, we can use manual key configuration safely while using the IPsec AH protocol, as long as we use ESN for the counter for the anti-replay mechanism.
Validation
We have used the formal validation language, PROMELA [7] to specify the validation model, and then used a tool, SPIN [7] , to validate our model, with the following requirements: 1. A different Security Association (SA) is activated for each directly connected sender. 2. An SA will be distinguished by the source address and the SPI.
3. The anti-replay mechanism is enabled. 4. All sorts of attacks a PIM router may face due to the forged link-local messages are generated. 5. For using ESN, the algorithm presented in the AH ID is validated. Our model consists of one receiver and three senders. Among the senders two of them are true senders. To generate different attacks, the third sender will send various forged messages to the receiver. Using SPIN, an executable verifier has been generated from the model. The output of the verifier confirms that our model is free from different errors such as assertion violation and invalid end state. It also establishes that the model has no unreachable state.
Conclusion
PIM-SM is going to be the dominant routing protocol for multicast based applications, if we can provide security for data packets and for the control messages as well. The core interest of our paper is to protect PIM link-local control messages from all sorts of attacks. We have proposed a very simple and complete solution. Finally, our solution has not added much more overhead and fully compatible with the original specification of PIM-SM.
